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NOTES
INTENTIONAL INJURY AS AN ACCIDENT
WITHIN INSURANCE POLICIES
Ballantine defines accident as "an event which takes place without
one's foresight or expectation; . . . if happening through human
agency, an event which, under the circumstances, is unusual and not
expected to the person to whom it happens."' Subjectively, from
the standpoint of the assailant, an assault is an intentional tort,
not an accident. 2 Viewed from the standpoint of the one assaulted,
however, such conduct may be characterized as an accident for the
purpose of bringing the injured party within the scope of insurance
indemnification. He may have rights as a party who has paid a
premium to an insurance company for accident benefits, or he may
be the recipient of damage payments made by an insurer which has
contracted with a person or an entity for indemnification against
liability incurred as a result of a tort-feasor's actions. The foregoing
briefly indicates the scope of this note. For the purpose of discussion,
insurance policies have been divided into two broad categories.
The first category includes accident benefits payable to the policy
holder under health, accident, and life policies. The law in this area
is more settled than that in the second class of policies, and is here
dealt with summarily.3 It is stated for the purpose of background,
orientation, and comparison.
The second category includes contracts for liability insurance.
These policies typically cover certain activities of the automobile or
home owner, common carrier, contractor, employer, or manufacturer.
Such contracts provide indemnity for legal liability incurred as a
result of injury to the person or property of another.
I. HEALTH, ACCIDENT, AND LIFE POLICIES
Authorities generally agree that intentional injuries to the policy-
holder, caused by another, are accidents within the coverage of these
policies. Thus, it has been said that when the injury or death is
wrongly inflicted; "such injury or death may be regarded as an
accident ... and this whether the injury to or death of the insured
1. Ballantine, Law Dictionary 13 (2d ed. 1948).
2. Prosser, Torts § 10 (2d ed. 1955).
3. This note is limited in scope to the area of liability insurance. It is here
that the only real conflict remains.
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was intended.", That the injury is intentionally inflicted "does not
of itself make it the less an accident."'
The substance of the law, therefore, is that any unexpected injury
to the policyholder is an accident, even if intentionally inflicted by
another. This is termed a "well-established rule" by Couch in his
treatise on insurance,G and the "overwhelming weight of authority"
by Appleman.7 Both writers indicate that neither the type of injury
nor the agent inflicting it is determinative of its legal definition as an
accident within these policies. For example, the injury or death may
be from shooting, stabbing, or hangings and may be inflicted by a
robber, burglar, murderer, or insane person.9
There are, however, qualifications to the equation of intentional
injuries and accidents. An intentional injury is not covered by
accident policies, or by health or life policies with an accident clause,
if such injury is the result of misconduct or provocation by the policy-
holder."' This is the logical result of analyzing the occurrence in ques-
tion from the insured's point of view, as is done by the majority of
American courts. Further, by underwriting practices, intentional
injuries inflicted on the insured by another may be expressly excluded
from policy coverage.
The previous discussion deals with injuries inflicted on the insured
by another. No conflict arises where the policyholder has intention-
ally maimed or killed himself; to allow recovery would clearly violate
public policy. But a "gray area" is presented by decisions in juris-
dictions which distinguish "accident" from "accidental means."
Courts not following this distinction merely consider the end-result
of an insured's act (from his perspective) in determining whether
the injury or death was accidental; those following the contrary
view examine the ,ieans by which death or injury was caused. The
latter rationale was illustrated in Smith v. Travelers' Ins. Co.,11
where, in administering a nasal douche to himself, the policyholder
inhaled more forcefully than in prior treatments, permitting germs in
his nasal passages to reach his brain, thereby causing death from
spinal meningitis. The court denied recovery to the plaintiff-bene-
ficiary, stating that the insured's act of inhaling was exactly what
he intended, and therefore was not accidental. A contrary and more
desirable result would have been reached by that court had it applied
4. 5 Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law § 1157, at 4063 (1929).
5. Id. at 4064.
6. Ibid.
7. 1 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 486, at 599 (1941).
8. Id. at 600-01.
9. 5 Couch, op. cit. supra note 4, at 4065-66.
10. Id. at 4064.
11. 219 Mass. 147, 106 N.E. 607 (1914).
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the language of Zinn v. Equitable Life Ins. Co.,12 where the court
stated: "the language of insurance policies is to be interpreted in
accordance with the way it would be understood by the average man,
rather than in a technical sense."13 Interpreting the policy in the
Smith case with Ballantine's definition of accident in mind,14 it would
appear that the death of the insured was an unusual and unexpected
event, and was, therefore, a meritorious death claim to be honored
by the insurance company.
II. THE LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICY
Text writers, contributors to legal periodicals, and courts, all
agree that the law relating to intentional injuries as accidents is less
settled in the area of liability insurance than in the field of accident
benefits payable under health, life, and accident policies. A possible
explanation for the lack of unanimity in the former area is the
presence there of certain public policy considerations not of impor-
tance in the latter. This aspect will be discussed later.
In the recent case of Jernigan v. Allstate Ins. Co.,"; an aunt of the
named insured 16 borrowed his vehicle and intentionally drove it over
the body of plaintiff's intestate. The court held that intentional
injuries so inflicted constituted an accident within the terms of an
automobile liability insurance policy. Neither litigant cited any
Louisiana cases in point. In testing the occurrence from the view-
point of the injured person, and ruling against the insurance com-
pany, the federal court followed what is stated to be the majority
view. This rule, with its qualifications, may be stated thus: An
intentional injury is an accident within the meaning of a liability
insurance policy, unless it is inflicted by or at the direction of the
named insured, or one qualifying as an insured under the policy
contract; or provoked by the injured complainant; or unless it is
expressly excluded by policy provisions.
It is submitted that close analysis of cases repeatedly cited as
contrary to the weight of authority will reveal that they are, for the
most part, distinguishable. The few which are not distinguishable
form negligible opposition to the majority, except within their respec-
tive jurisdictions.
12. 6 Wash. 2d 379, 107 P.2d 921 (1940).
13. Id. at 384, 107 P.2d at 924.
14. See text supported by note 1 supra.
15. 269 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1959).
16. A named insured is the person whose name appears on the face of the
insurance policy contract. Others, such as permissive users of the automobile,
may qualify for coverage under the contract, although not named therein.
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An understanding of the prevailing view is facilitated by examin-
ing its component parts. The following cases illustrate the rationale
and scope of the rule and its exceptions.
An Intentional Injury Is an Accident
In Westerland v. Argonaut Grill,17 an employer owned a public
liability insurance policy indemnifying him for legal liability incurred
as a result of injuries "suffered or alleged to have been suffered as
a result of accidents ... by any person ... upon the premises .... ,,
A patron was intentionally assaulted by the night manager. He
recovered a judgment against the employer, but being unable to
collect, he brought a garnishment proceeding against the insurer. The
court allowed recovery, emphasizing that the contract did not pur-
port to cover injuries caused by the insured's employees, but rather,
bodily injuries suffered by third persons. "Suffered" is the key word.
It indicates that an occurrence is to be tested from the injured indi-
vidual's perspective, and not from that of the agent inflicting the
injury. "An injury may be said, subjectively, not to be accidental,
although, objectively, it is."'"
This rule was reiterated and broadened a year later in the New
York case of Floralbell Amusement Corp. v. Standard Sur. & Cas. Co.
20
The court here indicated that an intentional and unprovoked assault
on a patron by a theatre manager was an accident from the point of
view of the injured, or of the insured theater.
It is a familiar principle that "the meaning to be given to the
words of the contract is the generally accepted meaning of such
words . . . ."- Accordingly, an accident has been suffered from the
standpoint of the named insured or of the person injured in the above
cases. And, as indicated in the Floralbell case, "an assault by an
employee . ..may be as catastrophic to the purse of the assured,
... as it is to the body of the person assaulted."
2
Injuries Inflicted by or at the Direction of the Named Insured,
or One Qualifying as an Insured Under the Policy Contract
The Floralbell case suggests the qualification to the majority rule
that "the policy is not intended to shield the assured as to willful
acts."- Appleman states "that one cannot insure himself against the
17. 187 Wash. 437, 60 P.2d 228 (1936).
18. Id. at 438, 60 P.2d at 229.
19. Id. at 439, 60 P.2d at 229.
20. 170 Misc. 1003, 9 N.Y.S.2d 959 (N.Y.C. City Ct. 1937).
21. Id. at 1006, 9 N.Y.S.2d at 961.
22. Id. at 1007, 9 N.Y.S.2d at 962.
23. Ibid.
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consequences of his willful acts, committed with the intent to inflict
injury. ' 24 Such insurance would encourage crime and violence in
obvious contravention of public policy. This exception is often incor-
porated into the policy as an exclusionary provision.
As indicated in the Floralbell case,25 the intentional tort of the
named insured's agent or employee generally results in the employer's
liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Here, however,
the public policy argument does not act to remove the employer from
insurance coverage. Although the third party is claiming against the
named insured for injuries intentionally inflicted upon him, the
named insured has not perpetrated the act. From this it is apparent
that if it is not the named insured who inflicts the intentional injury,
such injury will be considered an accident for insurance purposes.
There are, however, problems of interpretation, as seen below.
In a similar fact situation, the Wisconsin Supreme Court2" has
reached the same result as the Floralbell case-an employee's inten-
tional assault was termed an accident within policy coverage. The
court reiterated the importance of the public policy limitations, but
emphasized the correct limits of their application. "Although the
appellant [theater] may be held liable for such tort, [in respondeat
superior] it cannot be said that it committed the assault, nor that it
authorized it. Thus the appellant has not placed itself outside the
terms of the policy .... ,,27
In Georgia Cas. Co. v. Alden Mills, 28 the insurer was held account-
able under a public liability policy, when the named insured's foreman
assaulted one Pendergraft. To the insurer's contention that such
coverage was void as affording motivation for violation of law, the
court countered with the statement that the named insured had not in
any sense inflicted the assault. Therefore, "where a policy is legal
on its face, and does not undertake to indemnify the insured against
the consequences of its own illegal acts, it is not void because its
effect is to indemnify the insured against the consequences of the
illegal or criminal acts of others, without participation on the part of
the insured."'29
Thus far it has been indicated that if the liability policyholder or
any other person qualifying as a named -insured under the policy,
assaults or directs an assault upon another, the majority will refuse
coverage. Courts have, however, gone to great lengths to avoid
24. 7 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 4252, at 4 & n.8 (1941).
25. 170 Misc. 1003, 9 N.Y.S.2d 959 (N.Y.C. City Ct. 1937).
26. Fox Wis. Corp. v. Century Indem. Co., 219 Wis. 549, 263 N.W. 567 (1935).
27. Id. at 552, 263 N.W. at 568.
28. 156 Miss. 853, 127 So. 555 (1930).
29. Id. at 863, 127 So. at 557 (Emphasis added.)
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classifying the intentional tort-feasor as an insured, thereby allow-
ing recovery within the rule. To further effectuate coverage, courts
utilize the rule stated in a New Jersey case :30 "In construing the
policy, it must, of course, be borne in mind that in case of doubt, that
construction must be adopted which favors the insured." 31 This is a
well known rule of contract law32 which "finds frequent application
to policies of insurance which are ordinarily prepared solely by the
insurance company and . . . therefore, are construed most strongly
against it."
This rule was utilized in Glen Falls Indem. Co. v. Atlantic Bldg.
Corp.,'1 where the comprehensive liability policy involved specifically
excepted injuries "committed by or at the direction of the insured." 35
The president of the insured corporation, while engaged in the
business of hauling supplies in a truck, assaulted the plaintiff as
she attempted to park her car. The insurer contended that the
president's act was that of the corporation, and therefore expressly
excluded from coverage. The court, however, applying the above
rule of construction in favor of the insured, held: "[T]he liability
of the Insurance Company is the same as if he [the president] had
been an ordinary chauffeur in the company's employ."36
Similarly, in Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Aponaug Mfg. Co.,3 7 the
president of an insured manufacturing company committed an inten-
tional assault. The insurer, citing public policy considerations,
insisted that the coverage was illegal, as the insured's president was
an "insured" within the meaning of the policy. But, said the court,
although as to the particular insured, (the president) the assault
was not an accident, "the clause is without effect as to other persons
insured who neither committed nor directed the commission of the
assault and battery."8 Therefore, the company was covered and the
insurer had to pay.
Provocation by the Injured Party
A second qualification is that the injured party must not have
provoked the assault leading to his injury. If he has, it cannot be
said that such assault was unexpected or was an accident. The
30. Washington Theater Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 9 N.J. Misc.
1212, 157 Atl. 111 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
31. Id. at 1214, 157 Atl. at 112.
32. Restatement, Contracts § 236, comment d (1932).
33. 3 Williston, Contracts § 621, at 1789 (1936).
34. 199 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1952).
35. Id. at 61.
36. Id. at 63.
37. 197 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1952).
38. Id. at 674.
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assault or injury, however, may be so unusual or unwarranted rela-
tive to the provocation that it retains its classification as an accident.
Several cases where provocation was not in issue, have nevertheless
recognized its significance. 9 In Raven Halls, Inc. v. United States
Fid. & Guar. Co.,40 provocation by the deceased removed the inten-
tional assault from the definition of accident and from liability insur-
ance coverage. Deceased was a patron at the insured's bathing
establishment on Coney Island. He became "intoxicated," "boister-
ous," and "disorderly," and threatened to beat and kill the insured's
cashier. Then, without provocation, the deceased struck an employee
of insured repeatedly with a bottle, until the latter seized a knife
and inflicted fatal wounds upon his assailant. Looking at the occur-
rence from the injured person's point of view, consistent with the
majority approach, the court realized that the employee might have
exceeded his authority and used excessive force, but concluded that
"One repelling the attack of an infuriated assailant . . cannot be
expected to differentiate with exactness between lawful resistance
and unjustifiable force." 41 Therefore, the death was "the direct result
of the assault he [the deceased] committed upon Avitable [the
employee] and not an accident, within the meaning of the policy."4'1
Thus, an injury intentionally inflicted, if provoked, loses its charac-
ter as an accident and is not within liability insurance coverage.
Specific Policy Provisions
An insurance company may exclude intentional injuries from
policy coverage by incorporating exclusionary provisions to that
effect in the insurance contract.43 Such clauses are present in many
of the minority cases.4 4 However, at least one method of circum-
venting these protective clauses has been discovered, as illustrated
39. See, e.g., Georgia Cas. Co. v. Alden Mills, 156 Miss. 853, 127 So. 555
(1930); Fox Wis. Corp. v. Century Indem. Co., 219 Wis. 549, 263 N.W. 567
(1935).
40. 142 Misc. 454, 254 N.Y. Supp. 589 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
41. Id. at 456, 254 N.Y. Supp. at 591.
42. Id. at 456, 254 N.Y. Supp. at 592.
43. The following is a typical exclusionary clause taken from the policy
language of an insurance contract underwritten by a stock casualty insurance
company:
This policy does not apply:
(b) to injury, sickness, disease, death or destruction caused intention-
ally by or at the direction of the insured; ....
44. See, e.g., Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hammer, 177 F.2d 793
(4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 914 (1950); Soper v. Fidelity & Cas. Co.
of N.Y., 198 Misc. 1117, 101 N.Y.S.2d 581 (Sup. Ct. 1951); De Luca v. Coal
Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 203 Misc. 261, 59 N.Y.S.2d 664 (Sup. Ct. 1945);
Thomas v. American Universal Ins. Co., 80 R.I. 129, 93 A.2d 309 (1952).
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by the Glen Falls case,; which allowed recovery against the insurer
in spite of the presence of a typical exclusionary provision. Here the
rationale was that since the president had exceeded his corporate
authority as head of the board of directors, he was not acting in an
executive capacity when he committed the assault, and therefore was
not an insured, but rather a lower echelon employee.
III. THE MINORITY VIEW
Upon close scrutiny, the cases in this group are generally found to
be distinguishable, or of questionable significance because of their
narrow treatment of the problem. The insurer escaped liability in
these cases, but not solely because the intentional injury was not con-
sidered an accident under the insurance contract, and in some in-
stances, the latter reasoning was in no manner the basis for decision.
The cases will be discussed in several groups.
Intentional Injury by the Insured
In two minority cases the holder of the liability insurance policy
inflicted the injury. As previously indicated, coverage in such an
instance would violate public policy. Although the courts in these
cases attempted to rationalize their decisions upon some basis other
than the fact that the purchaser of the policy committed the assault,
such fact still remained in the background. Sontag v. Galer-6 is
typical. Here, the insured owner of an apartment building threw a
heavy vessel at some annoying children, injuring one of them.
The action was clearly intentional, and the possibility of its being
provoked by the injured child was not mentioned. Plaintiff was
awarded a judgment against the insured, and sought application of
the policy proceeds in satisfaction thereof. The insurer's demurrer
to this action was sustained, the court stating that, "It is the state
of the 'will of the person by whose agency it [the injury] was caused'
rather than that of the injured person which determines whether an
injury was accidental .... Furthermore, [and this is the significant
part] . . . an injury caused by the willful and deliberate act of the
insured such as is described in the finding is one for which the insur-
ance company would not be liable to her under the policy." 47
In another case,4' the named insured admitted ramming an auto-
mobile when he became provoked at his inability to pass. Because
45. Glen Falls Indem. Co. v. Atlantic Bldg. Corp., 199 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1952).
46. 279 Mass. 309, 181 N.E. 182 (1932).
47. Id. at 313, 181 N.E. at 183-84.
48. Weis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 242 Minn. 141, 64 N.W.2d 366
(1954).
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the intentional act was again that of the named insured, rather than
of a permissive user, the case is not a direct holding that intentional
injuries are not accidents.
Specific Policy Conditions
In Anton v. Fidelity Gas. Co. of N. Y.,41 a taxi driver assaulted a
passenger during the course of the former's business. The incident
occurred outside of the vehicle. The insurer was excused from liability
because the injury was not "caused by accident and arising out of the
ownership, maintainence, or use of the automobile."' 0 The insured
taxi driver indicated what he thought would be determinative of
the lawsuit by insisting that the motor of the taxi was running during
the entire affray. It is difficult to perceive whether the court held as
it did because of the intentional nature of the injury, or whether
there was no coverage because the injury did not arise out of the
"ownership, maintainence, or use" of the cab. In any event, it can-
not be flatly stated that the case directly holds that an intentional
injury per se is not an accident within the scope of a liability insur-
ance policy.
Provocation
The Raven Halls case5 is the only decision within this group. As
previously indicated, in this case the employee of an insured bathing
establishment stabbed his assailant to death during the operation of
the concession. This case clearly does not hold that an injury inten-
tionally inflicted by another is not an accident, but rather that such
an injury is not within policy coverage if provoked by the injured
person. Therefore, the case does not stand in derogation to the
weight of authority, but poses an excellent illustration of an admitted
qualification to the general rule.
Express Exclusion of Intentional Injury
In four of the cases cited for the minority there are found express
exclusions from coverage for injuries intentionally inflicted by the
individual or corporate policyholder."2 Illustrative is the Hammer
case,. 3 where the holder of an automobile liability policy intentionally
49. 117 Vt. 300, 91 A.2d 697 (1952).
50. Id. at 302, 91 A.2d at 699.
51. Raven Halls, Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 142 Misc. 454, 254
N.Y. Supp. 589 (1932).
52. See cases cited at note 44 supra.
53. Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hammer, 177 F.2d 793 (4th Cir.
1949).
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caused an automobile collision. The insurer was held not liable be-
cause "the policy issued . . . specifically excludes from its coverage
the unlawful act . .. ."" The court recognized the authority holding
that an accident is tested from the standpoint of the injured party,
but indicated that such a rule had no force when, as here, the
insured's act had been expressly excluded from coverage.
'The Indistinguishable Minority
The three cases forming this group:5 are, from all indications, still
valid authority within their respective jurisdictions. Earliest of
these decisions is the Briggs case.5 It holds that intentional injuries
are not accidents, and are not to be indemnified by insurance cover-
age regardless of by whom or upon whom they are inflicted. Al-
though this case is not overruled outright in Illinois, subsequent cases
in that jurisdiction cite the majority rule, and one mentions the Briggs
case, pointedly denying its effectiveness. 5 7
Two Ohio cases complete the minority group.58 The Headers case,5 9
a 1928 decision, held that an intentional assault by a taxi driver
employed by the insured company was not covered by the automo-
bile liability policy. It was followed in the Brinsky case60 six years
later. The cases are still valid authority in that state, but they have
not been followed in other jurisdictions.6 1
CONCLUSION
To reiterate, the holder of a liability insurance policy or one quali-
fying as an insured under the contract of indemnity will, under the
prevailing view, be indemnified from liability for injuries to third
persons, to the extent that the one seeking indemnification has not
intentionally caused the injury; to the extent that the injury pro-
54. Id. at 795.
55. Briggs Hotel Co. v. Zurich Gen. Acc. & Liab. Ins. Co., 213 Ill. App. 334
(1919) ; American Cas. Co. v. Brinsky, 51 Ohio App. 298, 200 N.E. 654 (1934);
Commonwealth Cas. Co. v. Headers, 118 Ohio St. 429, 161 N.E. 278 (1928).
56. Briggs Hotel Co. v. Zurich Gen. Acc. & Liab. Ins. Co., 213 Ill. App. 334
(1919).
57. Hawthoime v. Frost, 348 Ill. App. 279, 108 N.E.2d 816 (1952) (citing
majority rule); E.J. Albrecht Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 289 Ill. App.
508, 7 N.E.2d 626 (1937) (citing Briggs Hotel Co. case).
58. American Cas. Co. v. Brinsky, 51 Ohio App. 298, 200 N.E. 654 (1934);
Commonwealth Cas. Co. v. Headers, 118 Ohio St. 429, 161 N.E. 278 (1928).
59. Commonwealth Cas. Co. v. Headers, supra note 58.
60. American Cas. Co. v. Brinsky, 51 Ohio App. 298, 200 N.E. 654 (1934).
61. The case of E.J. Albrecht Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 289 Ill.
App. 508, 7 N.E.2d 626 (1937), rejects the Ohio cases specifically.
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ducing assault was not provoked by the injured complainant; and to
the extent that the act or acts in question were not expressly excluded
from coverage.
The various minority rules are.of little utility. Some are unwieldy,
due to their complexity of interpretation and application. An element
of unfairness is present in those jurisdictions which unqualifiedly
hold that intentional injuries are never to be indemnified. The same
holds true in those jurisdictions in which the duty of the insurer to
defend an action is determined from the perpetrator's state of mind,
rather than from the injured complainant's viewpoint.
Washington University Open Scholarship
